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I Introduction 
The Array E Uplink consists of a Receiver, Demodulator, Decoder, 
and Output Gates in standby redundancy. Switchover is accomplished by 
ground command or automatically within 61 hours after loss of uplink 
control (122 hours in slow bit rate). This redundancy approach differs 
from the previous designs and from the ELLSEP study design. This 
A TM will provide the reliability justification for the standby redundancy 
method and the lack of eros s- strapping to the Uplink selected for the 
Array E design .. 
II Background 
The difficulty associated with the implementation of redundancy in 
the command receiving and decoding portion of any system is inherent in 
the function of the subsystem itself. A failure in the downlink may be 
easily circumvented by a ground command to switch in the redundant 
element. A failure in the uplink usually cannot be rectified by ground 
command to the redundant side because the uplink itself has failed. 
One method of handling uplink redundancy is to sense the failure and 
to switch over to the redundant unit automatically. The problem with 
this method is that single point failure modes cannot be avoided. 
Sensing a failure often requires very complex circuitry which may itself 
cause the uplink to fail. 
III Three Methods of Uplink Redundancy 
Method 1 
The earlier ALSEP's employed partial active redundancy in the uplink, 
with automatic output selection from redundant receivers and cross-
inhibiting of redundant digital decoders; the demodulator and command out-
put gates were common to both channels. There were several potential 
sources of single point failure. The Reliability Block Diagram. is shown 
in Figure 1. The probability of failure for this partially redundant system 
is 5. 7 4% for two years of lunar operation. 
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Other than the single thread demodulator and output gates, in which 
every part is a single point of failure, the cross-inhibiting in the redun-
dant digital decoders is also a single point of failure which could not be 
removed by making the demodulator and output gates redundant. 
l 
Method 2 
To improve the reliability of the uplink for Array E, the ELLSEP study 
proposed a completely redundant uplink and dual cross-inhibitors to elimin-
ate single point failures. One half of the dual cross inhibitor is shown in 
Figure 2. 
The dual cross-inhibitor eliminated the single points of failure in the 
cross-inhibitor itself but did not remove the single point failure of the 
decoder not generating a command reset and thus locking out the good 
decoder. A SPF was added by the dual cross-inhibitors with the address 
detector gate Gl5 indirectly causing false executions in the presence 
of uplink noise. 
The probability of failure of the ELLSEP uplink design is calculated 
to be 0. 220%. It has 5 SPF's. The Reliability Block Diagram is shown 
in Figure 3. 
Method 3 
For Array E the preferred method is to have two completely redundant 
uplink channels, with the minimum of cross-linking. The only common 
points are the RF input to the redundant receivers, and the wire OR 'd out-
puts of the redundant command gates. Only one uplink channel is powered 
at any time, for the following reasons: 
1. 0 In general with active redundancy a fault in one output can override 
the other output and produce an overall single point failure of the system. 
The probability that any output gate will by its elf fail in this manner is 
low; however, each output gate is at the end of a chain of logic elements, 
each of which produces a phase reversal. In the limit a: random failure 
in either direction, anywhere in a chain has a 50% chance of producing 
an overall false output. Two active redundant channels, each of which 
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has a SO% chance of failing the whole system, have in combination no greater 
reliability then either channel by itself. In order to obtain the maximum 
possible reliability from redundant uplinks one of them must be run in 
standby. Standby redundancy removes the need for cross-inhibiting. 
(\,-
The standard logic chip in Array E is the TTL 54L type, with which 
active wire OR 'ing is not permitted but standby wire OR 'ing is. Standby 
wire OR 'ing provides a fail- safe redundancy technique; only transistor Q4 
in Figure 4 shorting collection to emitter will cause the loss of the command 
by shorting the signal to ground. The probability of this failure is only 
one thirteenth of the failure probability of the output gate instead of 50% 
of all the gates controlling the output gate. 
Standby redundancy roughly halves the power required for uplink 
operation. Strictly, only the OR 'd output stage must be in standby in 
order to obtain the increase in reliability, but there is little point in 
leaving the preceding stages of the standby channel powered if they are not 
effective. 
2. 0 Having established the necessity of standby redundant operation it is 
then necessary to ensure that if the uplink channel in use fails then the 
standby channel will be brought into operation immediately, or within a 
reasonable time. The switchover system must be entirely automatic and 
must be incapable of being permanently inhibited by command- -failures 
occur at random and could occur at a time when the automatic system had 
been inhibited. 
The overall purpose of each uplink channel is to provide command pulses 
on the command lines in response to transmissions from MSFN; the only valid 
criterion for uplink failure therefore is that command pulses are not being 
received. It has been suggested that the Motorola receiver threshold signal 
could be used in some way but that is not an acceptable approach, for the 
following reasons: 
2. 1 The receiver threshold signal is not affected by failures in the re-
mainder of the uplink channel and is not therefore an overall performance 
monitor. If Receiver "A" is good, but Demodulator "A" and/or Digital 
Decoder "A" has failed, then the complete system has failed. 
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Figure 4 TTL "Wire ORed" Output Configuration 
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2. 2 The method of "If A, then A; if not A, then B" used in the dual receiver 
is a potential single point failure. If 'A' fails so as to produce enough noise 
in the 1 kHz region to activate the threshold switch then the system could be 
locked up to a meaningless input. 
2. 3 The uplink carrier and modulation are not continuous, which means 
that power would be switched from one channel to the other every time a 
command was sent to Array E or any other ALSEP -perhaps 15, 000 to 
50, 000 switchings in two years. 
3. 0 The difficulty in using lack of command pulses as the switching crite-
rion is that ALSEP has no independent indication that a command has been 
transmitted, and it therefore has no positive means of detecting that an 
uplink failure has occurred. The only acceptable approach is to switch 
from one uplink to the other at predetermined intervals unless a specific 
command has been received in the intervals inhibiting each switchover. A 
1 specific 1 command, rather than 'any' command, is used because for 
practical reasons the latter method would require monitoring of the com-
mon execute enable output, which is a potential single point failure. 
4. 0 The source of the uplink timing signal must be reliable and the period 
must be convenient from the operational point of view. Regularly occurring 
natural phenomena such as the twice per cycle brightness and/or thermal 
variations associated with each lunation are reliable timing signals, but 
two weeks is too long a period. A period of 48 to 72 hours was selected 
as a reasonable compromise which inevitably means some form of clock 
internal to the Central Station. Previous unsatisfactory experience with 
mechanical timers, and the complication of the RSST, led to a completely 
new approach, concentrating heavily upon simplicity, with consequent re-
liability. Unless the estimated failure rate of the switching device is many 
times smaller than the estimated failure rate of either uplink channel, the 
full potential increase in uplink reliability cannot be obtained. 
5. 0 The possible sources of the basic clock signal were the uplink, the 
downlink and, if neither of these was satisfactory, an independent oscillator. 
6. 0 The uplink clock was rejected for the following reasons: 
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6. I Failure of the phase lock oscillator in the uplink in use could simul-
taneously block commands and st_op the switchover counter - a single point 
failure. 
6. 2 The slowest pulse repetition rate from the Command Decoder is con-
siderably faster than the lowest PRF from the Data Processor, necessitating 
more counter stages, with lower reliability. 
6. 3 The exact frequency is known only when the phase-lock loop is locked 
to ground transmissions; predicting switchings with any accuracy would be 
impossible. 
7. 0 The Data Processor downlink clock was found to be completely satis-
factory: 
7. I The lowest PRF is once per 54 seconds - the 90th Frame Pulse -
requiring only 12 counter stages to generate a 61-hour switching period. 
7. 2 The frequency is crystal controlled to within ::1:0. OI %, allowing precise 
switching predictions to be made. 
7. 3 The 90th Frame Pulse outputs from the standby redundant downlinks 
are OR'd into the uplink counter, so that it should continue to operate as 
long as one downlink clock is serviceable. If both downlink clocks fail the 
counter will stop, but this is unimportant as the system will in any case be 
effectively dead as far as MSFN is concerned. 
8. 0 The final point to decide was whether the uplink switch counter should 
be single or redundant. A single counter was chosen. Since a single counter 
and uplink switch circuit comprises only three 4 -stage counter chips, two 
flip -flops and ten gates - 8 logic chips in all - it has an extremely high 
predicted reliability, mor.e than sufficient to obtain the full potential re-
liability of the redundant uplinks. The counter is not a single point failure, 
in that both the counter and an uplink channel must fail before uplink is 
permanently lost. Finally, if redundant counters are used, the full 
potential reliability cannot be obtained without the occurrence of the usual 
problems of active/active and active/standby operation, with consequent 
circuit complications and individual reductions in reliability. 
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9. 0 In operation the uplink switch counter is set to a predetermined 
starting condition by the initial application of power to the Central Station 
and from then on runs continuously. It cannot be reset or controlled in 
any way by the MSFN. Every 61. 8 hours it produces an output pulse, and 
unless this has been specifically blocked by command Octal 174 sometime 
during the preceding 61 hours an uplink change will occur. The flip-flop 
which "remembers'' that Octal 174 has been sent is reset back to the 
1 switchover enable 1 condition after each switchover pulse, whether or not 
a switchover was actually permitted to occur. Even if an uplink is known 
to have failed there is no facility by which the remaining good uplink can 
be locked into permanent operation except by sending Octal 17 4 at least 
once per 61 hours. This is deliberate - the capability of permanently 
locking to one uplink or the other would invalidate the overall uplink re-
liability predictions. Multiple transmissions of Octal 174 have no further 
effect on the system than a single transmission, i. e., successive trans-
missions do not cause a toggling action or the inhibition of more than a 
single switchover. The memory flip -flop can be reset only by the counter, 
once per 61 hours. 
I 0. 0 An additional uplink control command, Octal 122, causes an immedi-
ate uplink switch, overriding Octal 174 evell. if Octal 174 is being activated 
continuously. This is necessary in order to overcome a potential single 
point failure, by which a group of commands including Octal 174 could be 
permanently activated, partially disabling ALSEP and preventing an auto-
matic changeover. Octal 122 is routed through the decoding gates as widely 
separated as possible from Octal 174. This ensures that a single point 
failure cannot fault both commands and prevent an automatic changeover. 
1 I. 0 The Reliability Block Diagram for the Array E design is shown in 
Figure 5. The probability of failure is 0. 085%. 
IV Conclusion 
Table 1 below demonstrates that the reliability of the Array E system 
is superior to the proposed ELLSEP design. The improvement in reliability 
justifies the trade -off of not having uplink control for 61 hours in the event 
of a failure. 
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TABLE 1 
TWO YEAR UPLINK RELIABILITY COMPARISONS 
ELLSEP ARRAY E 
Failure Probability {Two Years) o. 220% o. 085% 
Number of Single Point Failures 5 2 
Probability of Single Point Failure o. 074% o. 002% 
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Figure 5 Array E Uplink Reliability Block Diagram 
